We analyze Nash games played among leaders of Stackelberg games (NASP). We show it is Σ p 2hard to decide if the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MNE), even when there are only two leaders and each leader has one follower. We provide a finite time algorithm with a running time bounded by O(2 2 n ) which computes MNEs for NASP when it exists and returns infeasibility if no MNE exists. We also provide two ways to improve the algorithm which involves constructing a series of inner approximations (alternatively, outer approximations) to the leaders' feasible region that will provably obtain the required MNE. Finally, we test our algorithms on a range of NASPs arising out of a game in the energy market, where countries act as Stackelberg leaders who play a Nash game, and the domestic producers act as the followers.
Introduction
Game theoretical frameworks are powerful tools to model complex interactions between multiple strategic agents, where the each agent solve an optimization problem that is affected by the remaining agents' decision. Typically, the agents (otherwise referred to as the players) have conflicting objectives and each agent's decision could affect the feasible set and/or the objective of other agents. In non-cooperative game theory, these agents try and optimize their decisions to maximize their utility in a non-cooperative way and this is studied extensively in the literature. For a general view on game theory we refer the reader to the classic books of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Owen (1985) , and for algorithmic oriented books, Nisan et al. (2007) , Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009) .
In this paper, we exclusively consider the setting where the agents don't cooperate with each othera setting commonly referred to as non-cooperative game. We also work under the standard assumption that all the players have complete information about every other player's optimization problem. Such games are further studied as Nash games or Stackelberg games, depending upon if the agents decide simultaneously or sequentially.
In Nash games, typically a finite set of players simultaneously makes decisions, with an objective, and an understanding about the other players in the game and their influence on their objective. Nash games gained popularity since the Nobel prize-winning paper (Nash, 1950 (Nash, , 1951 which proved the existence of an equilibrium (which then got to be known as Nash equilibrium) for problems where each player has finitely many strategies. The concept then got extended to more general games where players could have a continuum of strategies.
Such games are now extensively used in modeling interactions between agents in various markets. For example, the world gas model (Egging et al., 2010) , the North American natural gas model (Feijoo et al., 2016 , the European gas models (Egging et al., 2008 and the competitive transportation model (Stein and Sudermann-Merx, 2018) solve Nash games where each player simultaneously solves a convex optimization problem parameterized in other players' variables. There are also examples of such games where player's optimization problems are non-convex (due to integer decision variables), for instance, the cross-border kidney exchange program model (Carvalho et al., 2017) , the competitive lot-sizing models (Carvalho et al., 2018, Li and Meissner, 2011) , the fixed charge transportation models .
In sequential games, there is a strict ordering of the players in terms of who decides first. Sequential games are known at least since the seminal results of Jeroslow (Jeroslow, 1985) which prove that the computational complexity of solving sequential games goes one level up in the polynomial hierarchy for every additional level (understood as round) in the sequential game. This strong negative result, restricted the number of levels to go beyond two very rarely in practice. Sequential games with exactly two levels are referred to as Stackelberg games or bilevel games and there is an extensive analysis of them. These games have a leader who decides first, keeping in mind that one or more players called the followers will make decisions, based upon her decision. These are relevant in a setting where a country (the leader) might want to set taxes, perhaps in order to maximize tax revenue or stabilize economy, and the indigenous producers (the followers) react to the leader's decision, and themselves decide the quantity to produce, in order to maximize their profit or welfare. For example, bilevel formulations are used by Bard et al. (1998 Bard et al. ( , 2000 to determine the government's (leader) optimal tax credits for biofuel production which impact the agricultural sector (followers) behavior, in the context of pricing problems where the leader sets prices to activities and the followers react by selecting subsets of activities (Labbé and Violin, 2013) , on network pricing problems (Brotcorne et al., 2008) where the leader sets tariffs for a subset of arcs of a multicommodity transportation network. Such models are also used in the context of pricing and environmental policies for electricity markets where power generators are normally considered as the leader and the network operator (also known as the Independent System Operator, ISO) as the follower (Feijoo and Das, 2014 , Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010 , Hobbs et al., 2000 .
In this paper, we discuss a combination of themes that we refer to as a Nash game Among Stackelberg Players (NASP) . It refers to a setting where the leaders of two or more Stackelberg games are engaged in a Nash game. An example of such problems, which will be referred to as a trivial NASP, is shown below. NASP is a subset of games referred to as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). Their use is immense in electricity markets (Feijoo and Das, 2014 , Hu and Ralph, 2007 , Neetzow et al., 2019 , Ralph and Smeers, 2006 . Hu and Ralph (2007) provide sufficient conditions when a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (defined formally later) exists for a given EPEC. Then for general problems, they provide algorithms to obtain other weaker equilibrium points they call as local Nash and Nash-stationary equilibria. Kim and Ferris (2019) recently introduced a computational framework to model EPECs, also addressing issues related to their complementarity reformulations.
The motivation for our paper is international energy trade amidst climate change. We model governments of countries interacting with each other in energy trade as Nash game. Further, the governments in the country are also involved in Stackelberg games with their domestic energy producers. The government decides the tax for producers in a country or alternatively a carbon tax based on how much emissions the domestic producers cost. The government is obliged to ensure energy sufficiency in the country by trading energy internationally and imposing sufficiently low taxes so that the domestic producers produce more while operating on an objective to minimize emissions, thus motivated to impose higher taxes on producers emitting more greenhouse gases. Given the tax policy of the country, the domestic producers who act as followers of the Stackelberg game decide the quantity of energy to produce, in order to maximize their profits. A schematic representation of the interaction between the players are shown in Figure 1 .
In an attempt to solve this problem, we have two concrete contributions. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first exact algorithm to solve NASP, even under the restricted settings where the objectives and constraints of all players are linear, except the followers' objectives which could be a convex quadratic. Without further assumption on compactness of the domain or without any limits on the type of interaction between the players (like a perfect competition assumption or Cournot competition assumption ), we solve the problem to obtain mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. We are also precise in identifying only the Nash equilibria and never a relaxed version of equilibria. Conversely, we always identify a Nash equilibrium whenever it exists. Our algorithm performs O(2 2 n ) elementary operations (where n is the number of bits required to represent the problem) to identify a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for NASP.
2. The number of elementary operations required to solve NASP is doubly exponential in the binary representation of the problem. This might make the algorithm look inefficient and one might wonder if the problem could be solved faster. We show that without strong consequences in the complexity theory, like the collapse of the polyhedral hierarchy, one cannot asymptotically produce algorithms faster than the one we provide in this paper, except for lower-order factors. We show that this result holds, irrespective of if one is interested in identifying or asserting the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria or mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for NASP.
In addition, we provide a computational framework to model energy trade games between countries as stated earlier. We use instances of this type of problems to test our algorithms, and provide computational results.
We organize the manuscript as follows. Section 2 is devoted to definitions and previously known results that are used in this paper. Section 3 reduces the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL problem to NASP to state and prove some computational complexity results on NASP. Section 4 presents an algorithm to find MNE for NASP, proves its finiteness and correctness and extends it with a primal-dual approach for acceleration.
Preliminaries
This section is devoted to defining the concepts used in the rest of the manuscript. In the following subsection, we define concepts corresponding to Nash games, bilevel games and recall relevant known results in game theory.
Nash game
Nash game corresponds to problems where the players of the game decide simultaneously and noncooperatively, trying to maximize their objectives, given some constraints. We formally define a Nash game and some of its sub-types as follow.
Definition 1 (Nash games).
1. A Nash game P is defined as a finite tuple of optimization problems P = P 1 , . . . , P n , where each P i is in the following form.
. , x n ). We call P i as the problem of the i th player. With the same terminology, f i and F i are respectevly the objective function and the feasible set of the i th player.
2.
A Nash game is simple if, for each i in Statement 1, the objective f i is of the form
for some Q i 0, c i , C i of appropriate dimensions. If, for each i−th player in Statement 1, Q i = 0, the simple Nash game is said to be linear (i.e., the objective function of each leader is linear).
3.
A facile Nash game is a simple Nash game where, for each i in Statement 1, F i is a polyhedron.
Definition 2 (Pure strategies). The set of all feasible solutions to the Nash game is called the set of pure strategies and is denoted by F .
Definition 3 (Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). Let P be a Nash game as in Definition 1.
A generalization of pure strategies is mixed strategies, a concept that is motivated by the fact that each player can choose randomly from a finite set of pure strategies, say, x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i ∈ F i ⊆ R ni with probability p i 1 , p i 2 , . . . , p i ∈ [0, 1] with j=1 p i j = 1. We formalize the concept of the equilibrium below.
Definition 4 (Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria). Let ν = (ν 1 , . . . , ν n ) where ν i is a Borel probability distribution on F i with finite support. Then ν is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MNE) if for all i ∈ [n],
Under some weak assumptions, an MNE always exists (Nash, 1950 (Nash, , 1951 . Computing an MNE could be relatively difficult in practice. Even for games with two players and finitely many strategies each, this problem can be shown to belong to the complexity class PPAD-complete (Chen and Deng, 2006 ).
Stackelberg games
In contrast to Nash games, where players take simultaneous decisions, in a bilevel (or more generally, in a multi level) game players take decisions in a given order. This arises naturally from the so-called Stackelberg game, where the leader decides first, optimizing their objective with respect to some constraints. Subsequently, the follower decides, with its objective and constraints now depending upon the leader's decision (Candler and Townsley, 1982) . In this manuscript, we restrict to bilevel games of a specific form. In order to establish a canonical form to model how the leader's variables affect the follower's ones, we introduce the concept of simple parameterization.
Definition 5 (Simple parameterization).
1. An optimization problem in y is said to have a simple parameterization with respect to x ∈ R n if the problem is of the following form:
are matrices and vectors of appropriate dimensions, and F ⊆ R n f .
In particular, the optimization problem is a convex quadratic program with simple parameterization with respect to x ∈ R n if, for some Q 0 and c ∈ R n f , f (y) = 1 2 y T Qy + c T y and F is a polyhedron.
2. A Nash game P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) is said to have a simple parameterization with respect to x if each optimization problem P 1 (x), . . . , P n (x) has a simple parameterization with respect to x.
Definition 6 (Stackelberg game). Let P (x) be a Nash game with a simple parameterization with respect to some x ∈ R n . Let f : R n +n f → R. Then an optimization problem of the form
is called a Stackelberg game.
Remark 7. Note that in the optimization problem eq. (6), the follower's variables appear under the minimization. Thus, the optimistic version of eq. (6) is being considered. In other words, if for a given leader's decision x, the follower has multiple optimal solutions, then the follower will choose among them, the one that benefits the leader the most.
Definition 8 (Simple Stackelberg game). A Stackelberg game is simple if P (x) is a facile Nash game with a simple parameterization with respect to x, F is a polyhedron and f (x, y) is a linear function.
Remark 9. Observe that particular structures in Stackelberg games result in the following:
• If P (x) is an optimization problem, eq. (6) reduces to a bilevel programming problem.
• In eq. (6), if F is a polyhedron, f is a linear function, and P (x) is a linear program with a simple parameterization with respect to x, then we obtain a continuous bilevel linear programming problem, which is known to be NP-complete (Bard, 1991) . Note that this is indeed a simple bilevel problem.
• In eq. (6), if F is an intersection of a polyhedron and Z n +n f , f is a linear function, and P (x) is a mixed integer linear program with a simple parameterization with respect to x, we obtain a mixedinteger bilevel linear program. This problem is known to be Σ 2 p -hard (Lodi et al., 2014) . Therefore, it is very unlikely that these problems have algorithms with asymptotic complexity better than O(2 2 n ). Note that it can be shown that this is not a simple bilevel problem.
Below, we define linear complementarity problems (LCP) for which the connection between the PNE of facile Nash games will be established in Theorem 14. In particular, LCPs enable us to derive and model first order optimality conditions for quadratic programs (Cottle et al., 2009 ) and hence reformulate a class of games.
Definition 10 (Linear complementarity problem). Given M ∈ R n×n , q ∈ R n , the linear complementarity problem (LCP) is to find x ∈ R n such that 7) or to show that no such x exists. The condition x ⊥ y is equivalent to x T y = 0. Also, we denote the set of all x satisfying eq. (7) as the feasible set induced by the LCP.
Deciding if an LCP is feasible is NP-complete. But we have efficient algorithms to solve LCPs in practice (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) .
Definition 11 (NASP). A Nash game among Stackelberg players (NASP) is a linear simple Nash game N = (P 1 , . . . , P k ) where for each i, P i is a simple bilevel problem.
A schematic representation of NASP is in Figure 1 . The central problem considered in this paper is to find MNE for NASPs or determine if none exists.
Definition 12 (Trivial NASP). A trivial NASP is a NASP where k = 2, and P 1 and P 2 are simple bilevel games whose lower levels are linear programs with a simple parametrization.
The additional assumptions holding on a trivial NASP (as of Definition 12) with respect to a general Nash in Definition 11 are seemingly strong. We require that each leader has precisely one follower -as opposed to finitely many followers -and that each follower solves a linear program -as opposed to a quadratic program -with a simple parameterization. However, in Section 3, we show that the trivial NASP is already a computationally complex problem to solve.
Below, in eqs. (8) and (9) we give a canonical form of a trivial NASP. For convenience of notation, we call the first player the Latin player (all parameters and the variables of this player's problem are shown in Latin letters) and the Greek player (all parameters and the variables of this player's problem are shown in Greek letters).
Known results
First, we summarize some well-known results for solving facile Nash game as LCP.
Theorem 13. Let P be a facile Nash game. Then P has a MNE if and only if it has a PNE.
Theorem 14. Let P be a facile Nash game. Then, there exist M, q such that every solution to the LCP defined by M, q is a PNE for P and every PNE of P solves the LCP.
We refer the reader to standard textbooks on complementarity problems for proofs (Cottle, Pang, and Stone, 2009, Facchinei and Pang, 2015) .
Theorem 15 (Basu et al. (2019) ). Let S be the feasible set of a simple Stackelberg game. Then S is a finite union of polyhedra. Conversely, let S be a finite union of polyhedra. Then there exists a simple Stackelberg game with P (x) containing exactly 1 player, i.e., a simple bilevel program, such that the feasible region of the simple Stackelberg game provides an extended formulation of S.
Theorem 16 (Balas (1985) ). Let S 1 , . . . , S k be polyhedra such that
In other words, given a finite union of polyhedra, one can find the closure of the convex hull of their union using the above Theorem 16.
We define SUBSET SUM INTERVAL below, a decision problem which is no harder than NASP as we show in Section 3.
Definition 17 (SUBSET SUM INTERVAL). Given q 1 , . . . , q k , p, t, k ∈ Z + , with none of them equal to zero, and log 2 (t − p) ≤ k, decide the following:
In other words, we seek -within an interval of integers -for a number s that cannot be expressed as a sum of a subset of {q 1 , . . . , q k } or alternatively show that no such s exists. Here, t − p can be chosen as a power of 2. For instance, ∃r ∈ Z + such that 2 r = t − p.
Theorem 18 (Eggermont and Woeginger (2013)). Given ∃r ∈ Z + such that t − p = 2 r , SUBSET SUM INTERVAL is Σ p 2 hard. Theorem 18 claims that, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the second level, there exists no algorithm to solve SUBSET SUM INTERVAL in o 2 2 k+r time.
Hardness of finding a Nash equilibrium
We characterize the hardness of finding Nash equilibria of NASP starting in this section. The results claim that -unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the second level -one would necessarily use Ω(2 2 n ) elementary operations to decide the existence and hence find a Nash equilibrium for a trivial NASP. The three theorems are formally presented below.
Theorem 19. It is Σ p 2 -hard to decide if a trivial NASP has a PNE. Theorem 20. If the feasible set of each player in a NASP is a bounded set, an MNE exists.
Theorem 21. It is Σ p 2 -hard to decide if a trivial NASP has an MNE. Proof of Theorem 19. To show the hardness of NASP, we will rewrite SUBSET SUM INTERVAL as a trivial NASP of comparable size. Then we appeal to Theorem 18 to establish the hardness of trivial NASP. Finally, we claim that NASP is only a generalization of trivial NASP, and hence could not be any easier.
For the sake of clarity, we call one of the Stackelberg games in the trivial NASP the Latin and the other the Greek. The decision variables of the Latin game's leader is x and the Latin game's follower is y. Similarly, the decision variables of the Greek game's leader is ξ and that of the Greek game's follower is χ. For the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL, we keep the notation introduced in Definition 17.
First, we define b 1 , . . . , b r ∈ {0, 1} as the unique r-bit binary representation of s − p: for instance,
q i , and T = t − 1 + rQ, which can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the data in SUBSET SUM INTERVAL.
Latin player The Latin player is a Stackelberg game leader, whose variables -along with their only follower's variables -are denoted by Latin alphabets x, y.
subject to
Greek player The Greek player is also a Stackelberg game leader, whose variables -along with their only follower's variables -are denoted by Greek alphabets ξ, χ below. max ξ0,ξ1,...,ξ P ∈R χ0,...,ξ P ∈R
We now claim that the game in eq. (11) has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, if and only if the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL instance has a decision YES.
Claim 1. The game defined in eq. (11) is a trivial NASP.
Proof of Claim. Note that all constraints are linear, and if the variables of the other player is fixed, the objectives are also linear. The follower is simply parameterized in their leader's variables. Also, the interaction between the two leaders follow the definition of a simple Nash game. Finally, there are precisely two leaders. Hence -by definition -the game in eq. (11) is a trivial NASP.
Claim 2. The region in the space of x defined by eqs. (11c) and (11g) is the Cartesian product of ({x i :
Similarly the region in the space of ξ defined by eqs. (11k) and (11n) is the Cartesian product of ({ξ i :
Proof of Claim. Notice that the constraints in eq. (11g) enforce y i ≥ max(−x i , x i − 1) and since y i is minimized, it is necessarily chosen to be equal to max(x i − 1, −x i ). However, if this quantity should be non-negative as enforced in eq. (11c), then either x i ≤ 0 or 1 − x i ≤ 0 should hold and the claim follows.
Claim 3. If (x, y), (ξ, χ) is a pure-strategy equilibrium for eq. (11), then ξ = 0.
Proof of Claim. Note that changing ξ 0 = 1 is a feasible deviation which improves the Greek player's objective, irrespective of the Latin player's decision.
Claim 4. If (x, y), (ξ, χ) is a pure-strategy equilibrium for eq. (11), then ξ 0 = 0.
Proof of Claim. If ξ = 0, then we are done using Claim 3. Suppose ξ 0 = 0 and for some ∅ = L ⊆ {1, . . . , P }, ξ = 0. Observe that the Latin player has no incentive to keep x 0 = 1 and have an objective value of 0. Instead, she can choose x 0 = 0, and x P + = 1 for all ∈ L and any feasible value for x P + for ∈ {1, . . . , P } \ L. One can rapidly check that this is feasible and optimal for the Latin player, given ξ 0 = 0. This also means that the Greek player's objective is 0, as each of the summands in their objective vanishes, and ξ 0 = 0 makes the first term vanish. Hence, this cannot be a Nash equilibrium since the Greek player has a profitable deviation by setting ξ 0 = 1 and ξ i = 0 for i = 0, which is feasible and has an objective value of T − 1 > 0.
Claim 5. If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision YES, then eq. (11) has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
, namely the unique r-bit binary representation of s − p. Hence, consider the following strategy.
It is easy to check that the strategy in eq. (12) is feasible. Given ξ, we observe that the strategy is optimal for the Latin player as follows. Note that due to the choice ξ i = 0 for i = 0, all but the first term of the Latin player vanish. The largest value the first term can take is when the choice of x 0 = 1. Leftovers terms do not affect the Latin player's objective, as long as they are feasible.
For what concerns the Greek player, the current objective is T − 1. We show that it is not possible to improve their objective. With ξ 0 = 1, no other deviation is possible. Hence, consider the deviation ξ 0 = 0: with such strategy the first term in the objective vanishes. Let M = {i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + 2r} : x i = 1}. Observe that |M | = r, and let L = {k + 1, . . . , k + 2r} \ M . Note that we require ξ = 1 for ∈ L. Otherwise the fifth term in the objective will be a large negative term, and the objective value cannot ever exceed T − 1. With such a choice of ξ for ∈ L, the fifth term in the objective evaluates to 0, and the fourth term evaluates to
Therefore, the objective value hence results in t − 1 + rQ − s. However, since it is a YES instance of SUBSET SUM INTERVAL, the deficit s in the objective value can never be made up by any choice of ξ i for i = 1, . . . , k and making the second term equal to s. If they are chosen to exceed s, then eq. (11m) is violated if it is strictly less than s, the objective cannot exceed T − 1 and hence is no longer a valid deviation. Thus eq. (12) is indeed a Nash Equilibrium. Claim 6. If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision NO, then eq. (11) has no pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium.
Proof of Claim. We prove the result by contraddiction. Assume that the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL instance has an answer NO and there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (x, y), (ξ, χ) for eq. (11), with ξ 0 = 1. From Claims 2 and 4, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium necessarily has ξ 0 = 1. Observe that from eq. (11m), ξ 0 = 1 enforces that ξ i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , T , and hence the Greek player has an objective value of T − 1. Now, with ξ = 1 0 . . . 0 , observe that the Latin player's objective is (T − 1)x 0 . Thus, we necessarily have x 0 = 1. From eq. (11f), we deduce x P +i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , P , while from (11d) we obtain x i ≤ r r+1 for i = 1, . . . , k. The only value of x i that satisfies this condition along with eq. (11g) is x i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k That only leaves x i for i = k + 1, . . . , k + 2r = P . Now, we show that for any value of x i , the Greek player has a profitable deviation, namely she can make their objective strictly greater than T − 1.
Let M = {i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + 2r} : x i = 0}. From eq. (11d), note that |M | ≥ r. We choose some L ⊆ M such that |L| = r, and for i ∈ L, we set ξ i = 1. Since |L| = r and L ⊆ M , the third term in the Greek player's objective evaluates to rQ. The fourth term is in between 0 and 2 r − 1, and the fifth term vanishes. Keeping in mind that ξ 0 = 0, the objective now evaluates to a number between
. . , k} \ I. This is feasible and makes the objective value equal to T , which is a positive deviation. Therefore (x, y), (ξ, χ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
This implies a corollary about bounded linear integer programming Nash games.
Corollary 22. Consider a linear Nash Game N = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) where each P i is a mixed-integer linear program. It is Σ p 2 -hard to decide if N has a PNE.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that bounded bilevel programs can be reformulated as bounded integer programs (Basu et al., 2019) . The problem defined in eq. (11) is a bounded bilevel program with each variable necessarily taking value in [0, 1] and can be reformulated into a mixed-integer linear program of similar size.
Next we show that, under an assumption of boundedness, an MNE always exists.
Proof of Theorem 20. Let the feasible region of the i-th player be F i , namely a bounded set. Since the objective is linear (given x −i ), there always exists an optimal solution, which is an extreme point of conv(F i ). However, given that F i are feasible sets of bilevel linear programs, we know that the feasible region of the players is a finite union of polyhedra from Theorem 15. It follows that conv(F i ) is a polyhedron. Since we assume also boundedness, the NASP feasible regiion is indeed a polytope. Thus the i-th player's strategy is the set of extreme points of this polytope which is finite in number. Since the same holds for each player, this is a Nash game with finitely many strategies. From Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1951 , this game has an MNE.
From Theorem 20, deciding on the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is trivial if each player has a bounded feasible set. We extend this result with Theorem 21, showing that even if the feasible region of one player is unbounded, then deciding on the existence of a MNE is Σ p 2 -hard. Before proving Theorem 21, we introduce the technical Lemma 23. While Theorem 15 shows that any finite union of polyhedra can be written as a feasible region of a bilevel problem in a lifted space, Lemma 23 explicitly provides the description of this set for a given union of two polyhedra. S has an extended formulation as a feasible set of a simple bilevel program.
Proof. The following bilevel problem gives the necessary extended formulation. Variables z 1 , z 2 , . . . are the variables in the lifted space, which can be projected out.
x ≥ 0 (14a)
From Lemma 23 we can further derive Lemma 24.
Lemma 24. Suppose S ⊆ R n1 and T ⊆ R n2 have an extended formulation as bilevel programs. So does S × T .
Proof. If S has an extended formulation given by (x, y) :
and if T has an extended formulation given by (x, y) :
then the following is an extended formulation of S × T :
With Lemmata 23 and 24, we can prove Theorem 21.
Proof of Theorem 21. We reduce SUBSET SUM INTERVAL into a problem of deciding the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for a trivial NASP. Let Q = k i=1 q i , and keep the same notation previously introduced for a Latin and a Greek player.
Latin player The Latin player is a Stackelberg game leader. The variables of the leader and the follower are denoted by Latin alphabets x and y respectively. max x0,...,x k+3r+1 ∈R y0,...,y k ∈R :
(x k+i , x k+r+i , x k+2r+i ) ∈ S (as defined in eq. (13)) ∀ i = 1, . . . , r (15h) (y 0 , . . . , y k ) ∈ arg min y k i=0 y i :
Greek player The Greek player is -as the Latin one -a Stackelberg game leader, where leader variables and the follower are respectively denoted by Greek alphabets ξ and χ. max ξ0,...,ξr+1 ∈R χ1,...,χr ∈R
Claim 7. The game defined in eq. (15) is a trivial NASP.
Proof of Claim. Note that all constraints are linear, and if the variables of the other player is fixed, the objectives are also linear. The constraints eq. (15h) are valid due to Lemma 23. Due to Lemma 24, we can have multiple bilevel constraints in eqs. (15h) and (15i). The follower is simply parameterized in their leader's variables. Also, the interaction between the two leaders follow the definition of a simple Nash game. Finally, there are precisely two leaders. Therefore, this is a trivial NASP.
Claim 8. The region in the space of x defined by eqs. (15c) and (15i) is the Cartesian product of ({x i :
Similarly the region in the space of ξ defined by eqs. (15l) and (15o) is the Cartesian product of ({ξ i :
Proof of Claim. Analogous to Claim 2.
Claim 9. x k+3r+1 takes integer values only.
Proof of Claim. From eq. (15h), each x k+r+i for i = 1, . . . , r can take a value of either 0 or 1, depending upon which of the two polyhedra (in the definition of S) the variable falls in. Moreover, considering that in eq. (15f), RHS is a sum of integers, the LHS, which is x k+3r+1 is also an integer.
Claim 10. (x k+3r+1 ) 2 = r i=1 2 i−1 x k+i + px k+3r+1 holds for the Latin player's feasible set. Proof of Claim. Consider the set S defined in eq. (13). For a point in the first polyhedra, h = x and y = 1, so one can write h = xy. Similarly, for a point in the second polyhedron h = 0 and y = 0. So again one can write h = xy. Thus, the nonlinear equation h = xy is valid for the set S. Now multiplying both sides of eq. (15f) with x k+3r+1 , one gets
The second equality follows from eq. (15e), and the third equality from the fact that h = xy is valid for S and eq. (15h).
Claim 11. Given some ξ r+1 ∈ Z between p and t−1, the Latin player has a profitable unilateral deviation for any feasible strategy with x k+3r+1 = ξ r+1 .
Proof of Claim. Note that if ξ r+1 satisfies the given conditions, then x k+3r+1 = ξ r+1 is feasible for the Latin player. Now observe the last two terms of the objective function. From Claim 10, we can rewrite them as (Q + 1)(2ξ r+1 x k+3r+1 − x 2 k+3r+1 ). Considering the last two terms in isolation, they reach a maximum value for the feasible choice of x k+3r+1 = ξ r+1 . Now, we argue that the player can never be optimal, choosing x k+3r+1 = ξ r+1 . As established in Claim 9, x k+3r+1 is restricted to take integer values, and for any other choice x k+3r+1 , the deficit in objective value is at least Q + 1. However, even if each of the other terms take their maximum possible value, the largest value they can add is 0.5 + Q < Q + 1. Thus whenever x k+3r+1 = ξ r+1 , they can be made the same to have a profitable deviation.
Claim 12. If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision YES, then eq. (11) has a PNE (and hence an MNE).
Proof of Claim. Let s be an integer such that p ≤ s < t and ∀I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, i∈I q i = s, and let b 1 , . . . , b r ∈ {0, 1} be the unique r-bit binary representation of s − p. Consider the following pure strategies for the players.
x k+3r+1 = s (16a)
x k+2r+i = s i = 1, . . . , r (16b)
x k+i = b i s i = 1, . . . , r (16d)
q i x i ≤ s − 1 and thus the strategy is indeed feasible for both the players. The Latin player has no feasible profitable deviation. This follows from the fact that x k+3r+1 cannot be chosen differently due to Claim 11. Moreover, the first two terms already take the largest possible value not violating eq. (15g). Thus the Latin player has no profitable deviation. Now for the Greek player, since x 0 = 1, the objective value is always zero, and cannot be improved. Thus the strategy in eq. (16) is indeed a PNE.
Claim 13. If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision NO, then eq. (11) has no MNE.
Proof of Claim. In this case for any choice of x k+3r+1 (Which is forced to be an integer between p and t − 1), x 0 = 0 will be chosen and x 1 , . . . , x k will be chosen such that eq. (15g) holds with equality. There is no incentive to choose x 0 = 1 which will contribute to only 0.5 in the objective. However, with x 0 = 0, the Greek player can choose arbitrarily large values of ξ 0 and there is always a larger choice of ξ 0 , which is a profitable deviation. Thus no equilibrium exists for the game.
Algorithms to find MNE for NASP
In this section we provide algorithms to compute MNEs for NASPs whenever they exist or determine infeasibility if no MNE exists. In this venture, we first present a preliminary algorithm in Algorithm 1 which enumerates all the polyhedra whose union corresponds to the feasible region of each player, computes a convex hull and finds a Nash equilibrium on the convex hull. We then prove that this is equivalent to solving the original problem. Then in Algorithms 2 and 3, we provide refinements of this enumerative algorithm that are expected to perform better in practice.
Preliminary algorithm
The feasible region. Let us consider the feasible region of a simple Stackelberg game as follows:
Algorithm 1 Preliminary algorithm to obtain MNE for NASP Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1 , . . . , P n ). Output: For each i = 1, . . . , n, x i j is a pure strategy played with probability p i j , presenting a mixed strategy with support size k i . 1: for i = 1, ..., n do 2:
Enumerate the polyhedra whose union define the feasible set F i of P i .
3:
F i ← cl conv F i , i.e., the closure of the convex hull of the enumerated polyhedra.
4:
P i ← objective function of P i and a feasible set of F i . 5: end for 6: Solve the facile Nash game N = ( P 1 , ..., P n ) to obtain either obtain a PNE, ( x 1 , . . . , x n ) or show that no PNE (and hence no MNE) exists. 7: if no PNE exists for N then 8:
There is no MNE for N ; exit returning failure. 9: end if 10: for i = 1, ..., n do 11: if x i ∈ F i then 12:
15:
p i j ← η j for j = 1, . . . , k i .
16:
end if 17: end for 18: return ( x i j , p i j ) for each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, ..., k i . Now, using KKT conditions of the players in P (u), one can rewrite eq. (17) as an extended formulation, in the following form, which we call as the set S.
where C is an indexing set, where complementarity should hold between x i and z i .
Preliminary enumeration algorithm. Algorithm 1 1 exploits the knowledge of the feasible region of each players, which is namely a union of polyhedra, as described in eq. (18) (and hence eq. (17)). We enumerate all these polyhedra in Step 2, and then in Step 3 we compute their convex-hull closure using Theorem 16. Now, with the guarantee that this convex hull will be a polyhedron, the problem is solved as a facile Nash game using Theorem 14 in Step 6. If the solution to the facile Nash game is feasible for a player, then the strategy is a pure-strategy for that player. Then, it is included in the Nash equilibrium as in Step 12. Alternatively, the strategy is not feasible for a player, but still within the computed convex hull, then one can write the solution as a convex combination of extreme points, namely pure strategies. The weights assigned to such points in the convex combination can be interpreted as a mixed-strategy for the player as shown in Step 14 of Algorithm 1. A pictorial representation of the algorithm is given in Figure 2 .
Theorem 25. Algorithm 1 terminates finitely and (i) If it returns x i j , p i j for each i = 1, . . . , n, and j = 1, . . . , k i , then the strategy profile is indeed a MNE for NASP.
(ii) If it returns failure, then N has no MNE. Proof. It is easy to see the algorithm ends in a finite number of steps. Note that all loops in Algorithm 1 are finite loops. Further, Step 2 ends finitely since there are only finitely many polyhedra due to Theorem 15.
Step 3 is also a finite procedure. Every other step is an elementary operation and ends finitely.
Proof of statement (i). Next we show that if Algorithm 1 does not return failure but returns a mixed-strategy while termination, then it is indeed a MNE for the original problem. First, we observe that if Algorithm 1 does not return failure, then in Step 6, a PNE is found for N , which is referred to as x. Consider the expected objective function value of all players: we can show it is constant for any allowed assignment of values p i j in Step 14. From the linearity of the objective function, one can observe that -for each player i -the following holds:
The first equality follows from the fact that the distribution for the MNE has a finite support (and hence both the sums are finite sums), and the rest by the linearity of the players' objective functions.
The existence of a profitable unilateral deviation from this MNE for N implies the existence of profitable unilateral deviation from the PNE x of N , which leads to a contradiction. Let † x i j and †p i j for i = 1, . . . , i be a mixed-strategy for the P i , which is a profitable unilateral deviation from x i for that player. Now, consider the pure strategy for N given by i j=1 ( †p i j † x i j ). The latter is indeed feasible for the P i . We will now show that this is a profitable deviation for P i in N , which would be a contradiction.
Hence, eq. (23) follows by plugging the profitable deviation into eq. (19), and exploiting its linearity.
Since we have a profitable deviation for the mixed stragey for N , there exists an unilateral deviation for N from x. This contradicts our first assumption, namely the fact x is a PNE for N . Therefore, such a deviation cannot exist.
Proof of statement (ii). In order to prove this statement, we show the contrapositive one. Namely, suppose N has an MNE, then Step 6 obtains a PNE for N and hence will not return failure. To prove this, it is sufficient to show that N has a PNE and since it is a facile Nash game, by Theorem 14, one can find a PNE. Consider the MNE of N be given by each player i = 1, . . . , n playing x i 1 , . . . , x i ki with probability p i 1 , . . . , p i ki respectively. Define the point x i = ki j=1 p i j x i j . It follows that ( x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a feasible pure strategy for N , and we can show that it is indeed a PNE for N . Given the above MNE for N , from Definition 4 we get
Here eq. (25) follows from eq. (24) due to the linearity of objective functions. If we can prove that eq. (25) holds for all x i ∈ cl conv(F i ) for all i, then we have indeed shown that x is a PNE of N . In the first instance, we show that eq. (25) holds for x i ∈ conv(F i ). Let x i = j=1 λ j x i j where x i j ∈ F i and λ j ≥ 0 and j=1 λ j = 1. Now consider the inequalities of eq. (25), each one for x i j for j = 1, . . . , l. Multiply these inequalities by non-negative λ j on both sides, and add to obtain
In the second instance, to show the same holds for x i ∈ cl conv(F i ) consider a convergent sequence
Thus eq. (25) holds for all x i ∈ cl conv(F i ), and x is indeed a PNE of N .
Remark 26. Note that in the proof of Theorem 25, we never exploit any property specific to simple Stackelberg games or simple bilevel programs. In fact, the only two properties used are (i) objective function of all players are linear (ii) the game is a simple Nash game. If such properties hold, the theorem states that it is sufficent to solve the problem for PNE in the convex hull of each player's feasible set to compute a MNE for the original problem. We remark the analogy between this and optimizing a linear function over some set S. If the convex hull of S can be computed, then one can just solve the convex optimization problem. In this spirit, if one can compute the convex hull of the player's feasible region, and if objectives are linear, thenevery game is a convex game.
Remark 27. One can relax the requirement of having a linear objective function and replace it with a convex objective function to check whether a MNE exists or not for a given problem. The direction of all the inequalities in the proof of Theorem 25 allows this replacement, and one can solve a convex simple Nash game and verify the existence of MNE for the given problem. However, the algorithm no longer constructively obtains a Nash equilibrium for this problem.
A refined approach. While Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to terminate and solve the problem, we introduce some procedures which can possibly lead to a solution by faster means. By far, the most time consuming step is Step 2 of Algorithm 1. The core idea we propose is to approximate the convex hull computed by Step 3, and iteratively refine it. Hence, we aim to possibly avoid a full enumeration of polyhedra.
Observe from Theorem 15 that the feasible region of a simple Stackelberg game is a finite union of polyhedra, and their convex hull can be computed using Theorem 16. However, since the number of polyhedra can be exponentially many, the description of the convex hull could soon become untractably large.
Hence, we describe two hierarchies -a hierarchy of outer approximation and a hierarchy of inner approximation, to the convex hull of the feasible region of the simple bilevel problem. While these hierarchies are valid even when dealing with an individual Stackelbberg game or a bilevel program, their importance is more relevant when dealing with Nash games among Stackelberg leaders, as the feasible region in each stage of approximation is a polyhedron. This allows us to solve each stage of the approximation as a facile Nash game.
First we start with defining a relaxation of S which we would henceforth refer as the polyhedral relaxation of S.
Note that clearly the set in eq. (26) contains cl conv(S), and is hence a relaxation. Also, while S is generally not a polyhedron, the set in eq. (26) is.
Inner approximation
Let b ∈ {0, 1} |C| and let C = {c 1 , . . . , c k }. We then define the selected polyhedron corresponding to b, P(b) as x satisfying the following:
Let J = {j 1 , . . . , j } ⊆ {0, 1} m f . Then the inner approximation defined by J is
Again, since I J is defined as a finite union of polyhedra, we can obtain an extended formulation for I J using Theorem 16. We also remark that I J ⊆ cl conv(S) for all J ⊆ {0, 1} |C| , and for the choice of J = {0, 1} |C| one can observe that I J = cl conv(S).
Remark 28. The size of the extended formulation of I J is bounded by O(|J |). To ensure a perfect description, we need a choice of J = {0, 1} |C| . However |J| = 2 |C| and a description of cl conv(S) will be exponentially large. Again, this cannot be beaten asymptotically unless P = N P due to Bard (1991) .
An algorithm, which we refer to as the Iterative inner approximation algorithm to obtain an MNE for NASP is outlined in Algorithm 2. In our setting of NASP, we iteratively construct inner approximations of feasible regions of the players in the NASP and compute a PNE for this approximated or restricted game (Step 4). We then asses if there exists a player who can profitably deviate from the Nash equilibrium of this restricted game. If no such player exists, then we can represent this point in the convex hull as an MNE to the original problem using Step 14 of Algorithm 1. If not, we refine the inner approximation of such player by including a polyhedron containing the best deviation for the player. Then the process is repeated.
The existence (or not) of an equilibrium at a given iteration of the algorithm generally does not imply anything about the equilibrium in the original problem. An equilibrium is valid for the original problem only if there is no profitable deviation. Also, the algorithm can possibly iterate without reaching intermediate equilibria in the restricted problems.
Example 29 (Inner approximation might have a Nash equilibrium while the original problem doesn't).
Consider the following players' problems and their inner approximation.
Latin Player: min
Algorithm 2 Iterative inner approximation algorithm
Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) and J = (J 1 , ..., J n ) where J i ⊆ {0, 1} |Ci| where C i is the set of indices of complementarity (⊥) conditions for the i-th player. 1: function IterInnerApproxNash(N, J) 2:
F i ←inner approximation defined by J i and F i ← cl conv F i .
3:
P i ← objective function of P i and a feasible set F i .
4:
Solve the facile Nash game N = ( P 1 , ..., P n ) to obtain a solution x.
Might fail 5:
x 1 , ..., x n ← getDeviation(P, x) return InnerApproxNash(N, J).
15: end function
Greek Player: min
Using KKT conditions on the follower's problem, the Greek player's problem can be rewritten as
Observe that the polyhedron P (b) corresponding to b = (0, 0) and b = (1, 1) are empty. And the remaining two polyhedra can be projected to the ξ space as [−5, −1] ∪ [1, 5] . Note that due to this, the problem in eq. (29) has no Nash equilibrium. This is because, irrespective of the Latin player's decision, an optimal decision for the Greek player is ξ = −5 (resulting in appropriate values for the other variables which don't affect the objectives). But for this value of ξ, the Latin player has an unbounded objective. Consider the inner approximation due to the choice J = {(0, 1)}. The equivalent feasible regions can be calculated to be
In eq. (30), the inner approximation is exact for the Latin player and is a strict inner approximation for the Greek player. However, eq. (30) has a Nash equilibrium (0, 1).
Conversely, it can also happen that each player might have a feasible inner approximation but the game has no Nash equilibrium. For such an example, replace the objective of the Greek player in eq. (29) to minimizing −xξ and the corresponding inner approximation of the Greek player in eq. (30) with ξ ∈ [−5, −1]. Here both the players have a feasible inner approximation, but the inner approximation game has no Nash equilibrium. However, the original game has a Nash equilibrium of (0, 5).
In case such failure occurs in Step 4 of Algorithm 2, we arbitrarily add one or more polyhedra to the feasible region of each player in the problem, and keep the algorithm running.
Outer approximation
We define outer approximation of the set in eq. (18) recursively as follows. Let J = {j 1 , . . . , j k } ⊆ C.
Algorithm 3 Iterative outer approximation algorithm
Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) and J = (J 1 , ..., J n ) where J i ⊆ C. 1: function IterOuterApproxNash(N, J) 2:
F i ←outer approximation defined by J i and F i ← cl conv F i .
3:
4:
Solve the facile Nash game N = ( P 1 , ..., P n ) to obtain a solution x. Might fail 5:
(o 1 , . . . , o n ) ← getViolatedDisjunction(P, x).
6:
if o i = N U LL for all i = 1, ..., n then An algorithm, which we call the Iterative outer approximation algorithm to obtain an MNE for NASP is outlined in Algorithm 3. In our setting of NASP, we iteratively construct outer approximations of feasible regions of the players in the NASP and compute a PNE for the game where each player's feasible set is replaced by an outer approximation (Step 4). Then we check if there is a player, for whom the solution to the above-relaxed game does not lie in the convex hull. If no such player exists, then we can represent this point in the convex hull as an MNE to the original problem using Step 14 of Algorithm 1. If not, we obtain a disjunction such that the current strategy does not lie in the convex hull of the disjunction, and refine the outer approximation.
We however note that Step 4 of Algorithm 3 could return stating that no Nash equilibrium exists, despite the original problem having one. This is in contrast to optimization, that if an outer approximation of the set is empty, then the original set is empty. Below we provide an example where the game between outer-approximated players has no Nash equilibrium, but the original game does.
Example 30 (Outer approximation might have no Nash equilibrium while the original problem does). In this trivial NASP, where we mention the feasible region of both the Latin and the Greek players explicitly as a union of polyhedra.
Note that the problem in eq. (32) has an equilibrium namely (x, ξ) = (0, 1). However, consider the following outer approximation
In eq. (33), the outer approximation is exact for the Latin player and is a strict outer approximation for the Greek player. However, eq. (33) has no Nash equilibrium despite the original problem having one. This is because, for any feasible decision of the Latin player, the Greek player's optimal decision would be to choose ξ = −1. But for this choice of ξ, problem is unbounded for the Latin player and hence there can be no Nash equilibrium. Conversely, it is possible that the game between the outer approximations has a solution, but the original problem, despite feasibility can lack a solution. Note that if the Greek player's objective has been to minimize −xξ, then the original problem does not have a Nash equilibrium, but the same outer approximation in eq. (33) has a solution (−1, 0). For the computational test, we run 150 instances using a complete enumeration algorithm and the inner approximation algorithm.
Computational test results
The instances correspond to a Nash game between governments of three to five countries, with an objective to minimize their emissions and potentially to also maximize their domestic tax revenue. In this pursuit, the countries trade energy with each other, and also impose a tax on their domestic producers, so that the emissions are limited. The country is also required to impose a tax that is not preventing profitable domestic production, as it is constrained to keep the domestic energy price less than a predetermined threshold. We present the optimization problems of the players formally below.
For ease of understanding the quantities in red are parameters, i.e., inputs to the model. And the quantities in blue are decision variables, decided by the country. Quantities in green are variables of a different player influencing the country's problem. The country C ∈ C has the following problem. min :
q p ∈ SOL(Lower Level Nash Game)
Here C p emmision is the emission penalty incurred due to producing a unit quantity of energy by the producer p. This number as the product of cost incurred due to the emission of one unit of greenhouse gases (GHG) and the quantity of GHG emitted due to unit quantity of energy produced by the producer p. b is a binary digit deciding if the objective should or shouldn't include the tax revenue earned by the government. q p is the quantity of energy produced by the producer p ∈ P, q C imp , q C exp are import and export quantities respectively, and α C , β C are the intercept and the slope of the demand curve. Now Figure 3 : Time Profile the domestic price is given by α C − β C Q where Q is the quantity of energy available in the country. Finally, π C is the price at which the country can import energy from other countries -this is the variable that connects the optimization problems of different countries. Optionally for some countries, we model a Carbon tax paradigm, where the tax imposed on the followers is proportional to the emissions they cause. i.e., we have a constraint saying t p = C p emmision t GHG , where the government decides the tax payable per unit emission. Finally note that if b is non-zero, the objective is no longer linear. In such a case, we replace the product term with a McCormick relaxation. Now we provide a description of the lower level Nash game, by providing the optimization problem solved by producer p.
The first two terms in the objective correspond to the cost incurred by the energy producer, the third term is the tax expense to the producer. The term in the parenthesis is the revenue of the producer, which is the product of domestic price and the quantity produced. Further, the producer is constrained by their capacity limits. Note that the product of variables (t p q p ) in the objective does not pose any additional difficulty to the problem. This is because the follower's problem is still convex quadratic for a fixed value of t p and the KKT conditions now give complementarity constraints which have only linear terms. The above problem is solved using the full enumeration algorithm as well as the iterative inner approximation algorithm. The iterative inner approximation algorithm employed to solve the instance uses three ways of proceeding in case failure is encountered in the Step 4 of Algorithm 2.
1. Add the lexicographically smallest k polyhedra to the inner approximation of the feasible region of each player.
2. Add the lexicographically largest k polyhedra to the inner approximation of the feasible region of each player.
3. Add k randomly chosen polyhedra to the inner approximation of the feasible region of each player.
Here k is referred to as the aggressiveness of the algorithm, and we run the algorithm for the choice of k = 1, 3 and 5. Each leader could potentially have a different number of followers and the details of the problems as well as the run time using full enumeration as well as each setting of the inner approximation algorithm are presented. A summary of the results are in Table 1 and a time profile in Figure 3 and Table 2 . In particular, in Table 2 we report some particularly hard instances. The first column is the instance number, while the second contains the number of leaders and their respective number of followers. The remaining columns report computational times (in seconds) for each algorithmic configuration. The last column represents the best-worst ratio in terms of computing times.
